Behind the Movement Turbulence: In-Depth Analysis of the Project Team, Liquidity Provider, and VC's Game and Breakthrough

Original Title: Crypto Pump & Dumps Have Become the Ugly Norm. Can They Be Stopped?

Original Source: Unchained

Original Translation: lenaxin, ChainCatcher

This article is compiled from an interview on the Unchained blog, featuring Delphi Labs founder José Macedo, SecondLane co-founder Omar Shakeeb, and STIX CEO Taran Sabharwal. They discussed topics such as liquidity shortages, market manipulation, inflated valuations, opaque lock-up mechanisms, and how the industry is engaging in self-regulation in the crypto market. ChainCatcher has compiled and translated the content.

TL;DR

1. The core function of market makers is to provide liquidity and reduce trading slippage for tokens.

2. Incentives in the crypto market may lead to "pump and dump" behavior.

3. It is recommended to adopt a fixed fee model to reduce manipulation risks.

4. The crypto market can refer to traditional financial regulatory rules but needs to adapt to decentralization.

5. Exchange regulation and industry self-discipline are key entry points for driving transparency.

6. Projects manipulate the market through inflating circulation figures, off-exchange trading to offload selling pressure, etc.

7. Lower project funding valuations to prevent retail investors from buying in at high bubble asset prices.

8. Opaque lock-up mechanisms force early investors into irregular liquidation, causing a sell-off event: dYdX crash.

9. VC and founders face misaligned incentives, with token unlocking out of sync with ecosystem development.

10. On-chain disclosure of actual circulation, lock-up terms, and market maker dynamics.

11. Allow reasonable liquidity release, layered capital collaboration.

12. Validate product demand before fundraising to avoid VC-driven hype misdirection.

(I) The Role of Market Makers and Manipulation Risks

Laura Shin: Let's delve into the role of market makers in the crypto market. What core issues do they solve for project teams and the market? At the same time, what potential manipulation risks exist in the current market mechanism?

José Macedo: The core function of a market maker is to provide liquidity across multiple exchanges to ensure sufficient market depth. Its profit model mainly relies on the bid-ask spread. Unlike in traditional financial markets, in the cryptocurrency market, market makers often acquire a significant amount of tokens through option agreements, thereby occupying a large proportion of the circulating supply, which gives them the potential ability to manipulate prices.

Such option agreements typically include the following elements:

1. The strike price is usually based on the previous funding round price or a 25%-50% premium over the 7-day volume-weighted average price (VWAP) post-issuance.

2. When the market price reaches the strike price, the market maker has the right to exercise and profit.

This agreement structure to some extent incentivizes market makers to artificially inflate the price. Although mainstream market makers are usually more cautious, non-standard option agreements do carry potential risks. We recommend that projects adopt a "fixed fee" model, where a fixed fee is paid monthly to hire a market maker and require them to maintain a reasonable bid-ask spread and ongoing market depth, rather than driving prices through a complex incentive structure. In short, fees should be unrelated to token price performance; cooperation should be service-oriented; and goals should not be distorted by incentive mechanisms.

Taran Sabharwal: The core value of a market maker lies in reducing trade slippage. For example, I once conducted a seven-figure trade on Solana, which resulted in a 22% on-chain slippage, whereas a professional market maker can significantly optimize this metric. Considering that their service saves costs for all traders, market makers should receive corresponding compensation. When selecting a market maker, the project team needs to clarify the incentive goals. Under a basic service model, market makers mainly provide liquidity and underwriting services; whereas under a short-term consultancy model, they set short-term incentives around key milestones such as mainnet launch, for example, by stabilizing prices through a TWAP-trigger mechanism.

However, if the strike price is set too high, once the price far exceeds expectations, market makers may engage in option arbitrage and sell off tokens on a large scale, exacerbating market volatility. The lesson learned is to avoid setting excessively high strike prices, prioritize the basic service model, and control the uncertainty brought about by complex agreements.

Omar Shakeeb: There are two core issues with the current market making mechanism.

First, the incentive mechanism is misaligned. Liquidity providers often focus more on arbitrage opportunities brought by price increases rather than fulfilling their basic duty of providing liquidity. They should be attracting retail traders by continuously providing liquidity, not solely relying on betting on price fluctuations for arbitrage gains. Second, transparency is severely lacking. Project teams typically engage multiple liquidity providers simultaneously, but these institutions operate independently without a collaborative mechanism. Currently, only the project foundation and exchanges have the specific list of liquidity provider partnerships, while secondary market participants are completely unable to access information about the trade executors. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to hold responsible parties accountable in case of market anomalies.

(2) Movement Controversy: The Truth about Private Sales, Liquidity Provision, and Transparency

Laura Shin: Has your company been involved in Movement-related activities?

Omar Shakeeb: Our company has indeed been involved in Movement-related activities, but only in the private sale market. Our business process is extremely rigorous, and we maintain close communication with project founders like Taran. We have conducted thorough background checks and due diligence on every investor, advisor, and other participants. However, we are not informed about the pricing and specific operations involved in liquidity provision. The relevant documents are solely held internally by the project foundation and liquidity providers and are not disclosed to other parties.

Laura Shin: So, has your company acted as a liquidity provider during the Token Generation Event (TGE)? However, I assume your agreement with the foundation differs significantly from that of the liquidity provider, right?

Omar Shakeeb: No, we have not engaged in liquidity provision business. What we do is private sale market business, which is a completely different realm from liquidity provision. The private sale market is essentially an over-the-counter (OTC) transaction that usually occurs before and after the TGE.

José Macedo: Did Rushi sell tokens via OTC transactions?

Omar Shakeeb: To the best of my knowledge, Rushi did not sell tokens via OTC transactions. The foundation has explicitly stated that they will not engage in token sales, but verifying this commitment remains a challenge. Liquidity provider transactions also carry this risk. Even if a liquidity provider completes a large transaction, it may merely represent the project team's token sale, and outsiders cannot ascertain the specific details. This is the issue caused by transparency deficiency. I suggest that from the early stages of token distribution, wallets should be clearly labeled, such as with "Foundation Wallet," "CEO Wallet," "Co-founder Wallet," etc. Through this method, the source of each transaction can be traced, clarifying the actual sale situations of all parties.

José Macedo: We did consider tagging wallets at one point, but this measure could potentially lead to privacy leaks and increased barriers to entry, among other issues.

（III）Exchanges and Industry Self-Regulation: Feasibility of Regulatory Implementation

José Macedo: As emphasized by Hester Pierce in a recent Safe Harbor Rule proposal, project teams should disclose their liquidity arrangements. Currently, exchanges tend to maintain low circulation to achieve high valuations, while market makers rely on information asymmetry to earn high fees. We can learn from the regulatory experiences of traditional finance (TradFi). The Securities Exchange Act of the 1930s and the market manipulation techniques exposed in Edwin Lefebvre's "Reminiscences of a Stock Operator" in the 1970s and 80s, such as inducing retail traders to buy in through artificial volume inflation, bear striking resemblance to certain phenomena in the current cryptocurrency market.

Therefore, we propose to introduce these mature regulatory regimes into the cryptocurrency space to effectively curb price manipulation. Specific measures include:

1. Prohibiting fake orders, front-running, and preferential execution to manipulate market prices.

2. Ensuring transparency and fairness in the price discovery mechanism to prevent any behavior that could distort price signals.

Laura Shin: Achieving transparency between issuers and market makers faces many challenges. As Evgeny Gavoy pointed out on "The Chop Block" program, the market-making mechanisms in the Asian market generally lack transparency, and achieving globally unified regulation is almost impossible. So, how can these obstacles be overcome? Can industry self-regulation drive change? Is it possible in the short term to form a hybrid model of "global convention + regional implementation"?

Omar Shakeeb: The extreme opacity of the market's underlying operations is the biggest issue. If top market makers could voluntarily establish an open-source disclosure mechanism, this would significantly improve the current state of the market.

Laura Shin: But would this approach lead to the "Gresham's Law" phenomenon? Violators may avoid regulatory bodies, so how can we truly curb such misconduct?

José Macedo: From a regulatory perspective, transparency can be promoted through the Exchange Auditing Mechanism. Specific measures include: requiring exchanges to disclose their market maker lists and establishing a "Compliance Whitelist" system.

Additionally, industry self-regulation is equally important. For example, the auditing mechanism is a typical case. Although not legally mandated, projects that are not audited today are almost impossible to invest in. Similarly, qualifications reviews of market makers can establish similar standards. If a project is found to be using a non-compliant market maker, its reputation will be damaged. Just as there are differences in audit firms, a market maker's reputation system also needs to be established.

Feasibility of regulatory implementation is a key entry point for centralized exchanges. These exchanges generally aim to serve U.S. users, and U.S. law has broad jurisdiction over crypto businesses. Therefore, regardless of whether a user is in the U.S., as long as they use a U.S. exchange, they must comply with relevant regulations.

In summary, Exchange Regulation and Industry Self-Regulation can both be important means to effectively regulate market behavior.

Laura Shin: You mentioned that market maker information should be publicly disclosed, and compliant market makers should be market-recognized. However, if someone deliberately chooses to use a non-compliant market maker, and these types of institutions lack the incentive to publicly disclose their partnerships, the following situations may arise: The project appears to use a compliant market maker on the surface to maintain its reputation, but in reality, it may also engage with opaque institutions for operations. The key issues are:

1. How to ensure that the project fully discloses all partnered market makers?

2. How can the outside world discover the fraudulent activities of market makers who do not voluntarily disclose information?

José Macedo: If a violation is found where an exchange illicitly uses a non-whitelisted institution, this is equivalent to fraudulent behavior. Although theoretically project teams can collaborate with multiple market makers, in practice, due to the limited circulation of most projects, there are usually only 1-2 core market makers, making it difficult to conceal the true partners.

Taran Sabharwal: This issue should be analyzed from the perspective of market makers. Firstly, simply categorizing market makers as "compliant" or "non-compliant" is one-sided. How can non-regulated exchanges ensure the compliance of their trading entities? The top three exchanges (Binance, OKEx, Bybit) are offshore and unregulated institutions, while Upbit focuses on the Korean spot trading market. Regulation faces many challenges, including geographical differences, top-tier monopolies, and excessively high entry barriers. In terms of accountability, project founders should bear primary responsibility for their conduct. Although exchange review mechanisms are quite stringent, they still struggle to eliminate circumvention operations.

Using Movement as an example, its fundamental issue is social failure, such as overcommitment and improper transfer of control, rather than technical flaws. Despite its token market cap plummeting from 140 billion FTB to 20 billion, many new projects still imitate its model. However, the team's structural mistakes, especially the improper transfer of control, ultimately led to the project going to zero.

Laura Shin: In light of the many issues exposed, how should all parties collaborate to address them?

José Macedo: Disclosing the true circulation supply is key. Many projects inflate the circulation supply to inflate valuation, but in reality, a large number of tokens are still locked up. However, tokens held by foundations and labs are usually not subject to lock-up restrictions, meaning they can sell through market makers on the token's launch day. This operation is essentially a form of "soft exit": the team cashes out when the market is most heated on launch day, then uses this fund to repurchase team tokens unlocked a year later or to temporarily boost the protocol's TVL before exiting.

In terms of token distribution mechanisms, a cost-based unlocking mechanism should be introduced, following the practices of platforms like Legion or Echo. Currently, channels like Binance Launchpool have significant flaws, making it difficult to distinguish between real user funds and platform reserves in multi-billion-dollar pools. Therefore, establishing a more transparent public sale mechanism is urgently needed. Transparency in the market-making process and ensuring retail investors can clearly understand the token's actual ownership status are also crucial. While most projects have made progress in transparency, further improvements are still needed. As such, public market makers should be required to disclose token lending protocol details, including borrowing amounts, option agreements, and their exercise prices, to provide retail investors with more comprehensive market insights to help them make wiser investment decisions.

Overall, disclosing the true circulation supply, standardizing market-making protocol disclosures, and improving token distribution mechanisms are the most urgent reform directions at present.

Omar Shakeeb: The primary issue is to adjust the financing valuation system. Current project valuations are inflated, generally ranging from 30 to 50 billion USD, exceeding retail investors' tolerance. Using Movement as an example, its token went from a 140 billion valuation to 20 billion, and such high initial valuations are detrimental to all parties. It is necessary to return to early valuations levels akin to Solana (3-4 billion USD), allowing more users to participate at a reasonable price and promoting a healthier ecosystem development. Regarding the use of ecosystem funds, we have observed that project teams often face operational dilemmas: entrust to market makers? engage in OTC transactions? or other methods? We always recommend opting for OTC transactions, as this ensures that the recipient of the funds aligns with the project's strategic goals. Celestia is a classic case; they funded over $100 million at a valuation of 30 billion post-token issuance but efficiently allocated funds through proper planning.

（4）The Truth About Market Manipulation

Laura Shin: Is the essence of current market regulation measures to gradually guide artificially manipulated token activities, such as market maker intervention, towards a development trajectory that aligns with natural market rules? Can this transformation achieve a win-win situation, ensuring the interests of early investors while also guaranteeing the sustainable development of project teams?

José Macedo: The structural contradiction facing the current market lies in the imbalance of the valuation system. In the previous bull market, due to project scarcity, the market saw a general uptrend; whereas in this cycle, due to overinvestment by Venture Capital (VC), there has been a severe oversupply of infrastructure tokens, causing the majority of funds to fall into a loss cycle and forcing them to raise new funds by selling off their holdings.

This supply-demand imbalance has directly altered market behavior. Buyer funds exhibit a fragmented nature, with holding periods shortening from years to months or even weeks. The over-the-counter trading market has fully transitioned to hedge strategies, with investors maintaining market neutrality through options tools, completely abandoning the naked long strategies of the previous cycle. Project teams must face this shift: the success of Solana and AVAX was built during an industry vacuum period, while new projects need to adopt a low circulation strategy (e.g., Ondo maintains actual circulation below 2%) and maintain price stability through off-exchange agreements with large holders like Columbia University.

Projects such as Sui and Mantra, which have performed well this cycle, have validated the effectiveness of this approach, while Movement's attempt to stimulate price through tokenomics design without a mainnet has been a significant strategic mistake.

Laura Shin: If Columbia University did not create a wallet, how did they receive these tokens? This seems somewhat illogical.

Taran Sabharwal: As one of the main institutional holders of Ondo, Columbia University's tokens are in a non-circulating state due to the lack of a wallet creation, objectively creating a phenomenon of "paper circulation." The project's tokenomic structure exhibits significant features: since a large-scale unlock in January of this year, no new tokens will be released until January 2025. Market data shows that despite active perpetual contract trading, the spot order book depth is severely lacking, and this artificially induced liquidity shortage makes the price susceptible to small fund influences.

On the contrary, Mantra adopted a more aggressive liquidity manipulation strategy. The project team transferred selling pressure to futures buyers through off-market trades, while using the proceeds to pump the spot market. With only $20-40 million utilized, they created a 100x price increase on a shallow order book, skyrocketing the market cap from $100 million to $12 billion. This "time arbitrage" mechanism essentially leveraged liquidity manipulation for a short squeeze, rather than a price discovery process based on real demand.

Omar Shakeeb: The crux of the issue lies in the project team implementing a multi-lock mechanism, yet these lockup terms were never publicly disclosed, which is the most intricate part of the entire event.

José Macedo: Authoritative data sources like CoinGecko display a severe distortion in token circulation. The project team often counts "non-active tokens" controlled by the foundation and team as part of the circulating supply, leading to a reported circulating supply exceeding 50%, while the actual circulating supply that entered the market may be less than 5%, with 4% still controlled by market makers.

This kind of systematic data manipulation is suspected of fraud. When investors trade based on a mistaken perception of a 60% circulating supply, in reality, 55% of the tokens are frozen by the project team in cold wallets. This significant information asymmetry directly distorts the price discovery mechanism, making the mere 5% true circulating supply a tool for market manipulation.

Laura Shin: JP (Jump Trading)'s market manipulation techniques have been widely studied. Do you see this as an innovative model worth emulating, or does it reflect a short-term arbitrage mindset among market participants? How should we characterize the essence of such strategies?

Taran Sabharwal: JP's operations demonstrate a sophisticated ability to control market supply and demand, but its essence lies in creating a short-term value illusion through artificially induced liquidity scarcity. This strategy is non-replicable and, in the long run, detrimental to the healthy development of the market. The current market's mimicry phenomenon precisely exposes participants' profit-driven mentality, overly focusing on market cap manipulation and neglecting real value creation.

José Macedo: It is crucial to distinguish between "innovation" and "manipulation." In traditional financial markets, similar operations would be classified as market manipulation behavior. The crypto market, due to regulatory gaps, may seem "legal," but fundamentally, it's wealth transfer through information asymmetry, not sustainable market innovation.

Taran Sabharwal: The core issue lies in market participants' behavior patterns. In the current crypto market, the vast majority of retail investors lack basic due diligence awareness, and their investment behavior is fundamentally closer to gambling rather than rational investment. This irrational mindset of chasing short-term gains objectively creates an ideal operating environment for market manipulators.

Omar Shakeeb: The key problem lies in the project team implementing a multi-layered locking mechanism, but these locking terms were never publicly disclosed, which is the most tricky part of the whole event.

Taran Sabharwal: The truth of market manipulation often lies in the order book, when a $1 million buy order can drive a 5% price fluctuation, indicating that market depth essentially does not exist. Many project teams exploit technical unlocking vulnerabilities (where tokens are unlocked but effectively long-term locked) to falsely report circulating supply, leading to short sellers misjudging risks. When Mantra first broke through a $10 billion market cap, a large number of short sellers were liquidated and forced to exit. WorldCoin is a typical case. Early last year, its fully diluted valuation reached as high as $120 billion, but the actual circulating market cap was only $5 billion, creating a more extreme circulating supply shortage than ICP did that year. Although this operation has allowed WorldCoin to maintain a $20 billion valuation to this day, it is essentially harvesting the market through an information asymmetry. However, a fair assessment of JP is needed: during the market's low point, he even sold personal assets to repurchase tokens and maintained project operations through equity financing. This kind of dedication to the project indeed demonstrates the founder's responsibility.

Omar Shakeeb: Although JP is currently trying to turn the tide, it is extremely difficult to make a comeback once deeply entrenched in this situation. Once market trust collapses, it is hard to rebuild.

(V) Founder vs. VC: The Game of Tokenomics: Long-Term Value of Tokens

Laura Shin: Do we have a fundamental disagreement on the development philosophy of the crypto ecosystem, whether Bitcoin, CEX are fundamentally different? Should the crypto industry prioritize encouraging short-term arbitrage in token game design, or should it return to value creation? When price and utility are disconnected, does the industry still have long-term value?

Taran Sabharwal: The issues in the crypto market are not unique, and similar to the traditional stock market, there is also liquidity manipulation in small-cap stocks. However, the current crypto market has evolved into a fierce battlefield among institutions, where market makers hunt down proprietary traders, quant funds harvest hedge funds, and retail investors have long been marginalized.

This industry is gradually deviating from the original intention of cryptocurrency technology. When new entrants market Dubai real estate to practitioners, the market has essentially turned into a blatant wealth-grabbing game. A typical example is dBridge, which, despite its cutting-edge cross-chain technology, has a token market cap of only 30 million dollars; in contrast, a meme coin with no technological substance easily surpasses a hundred billion valuation with a marketing gimmick. This distorted incentive mechanism is eroding the foundation of the industry. When a trader can profit 20 million dollars by hyping a "meme coin," who will still dedicate themselves to polishing a product? The crypto spirit is being eroded by a short-term arbitrage culture, and builders' innovation drive is facing a severe challenge.

José Macedo: The current crypto market has two radically different narrative logics. Viewing it as a zero-sum game "casino" versus seeing it as a technology innovation engine leads to completely opposite conclusions. Although the market is filled with VC short-term arbitrage and project team market capitalization management speculative behaviors, there are also many builders quietly developing identity protocols, decentralized exchanges, and other infrastructure.

Similar to the traditional venture capital field, where 90% of startups fail but drive overall innovation. The core contradiction of the current token economy lies in a flawed launch mechanism that may permanently damage a project's potential. When an engineer witnesses a token plummet by 80%, who would be willing to join? This highlights the importance of designing a sustainable token model: it must resist short-term speculative temptations while also reserving resources for long-term development. Encouragingly, more and more founders are proving that crypto technology can transcend financial gaming.

Laura Shin: The real dilemma lies in how to define a "soft landing."

In an ideal state, token unlocks should be deeply tied to the maturity of the ecosystem. Only when the community achieves self-organized operation and the project enters a sustainable development stage does the profit behavior of the founding team become legitimate. However, the practical dilemma is that, aside from time locks, almost all unlocking conditions can be artificially manipulated, which is the core contradiction facing the current tokenomic design.

Omar Shakeeb: The root of the current tokenomic design problem lies in the VC and founder's initial fundraising negotiations, emphasizing tokenomics involve a multi-stakeholder balance that must meet LP return demands and be accountable to retail investors. However, in reality, project teams often sign secret agreements with top funds (such as A16Z's investment in Aguilera with high valuation terms revealed months later), retail investors cannot access off-exchange trading details, leading to liquidity management becoming a systemic challenge. Token issuance is not the endpoint but the beginning of responsibility for the crypto ecosystem; each failed token experiment is consuming market trust capital. If founders cannot ensure the token's long-term value, they should stick to an equity financing model.

José Macedo: The VC and Founder Misalignment of Interests is a core contradiction, where VCs seek to maximize portfolio returns, while founders face significant wealth temptation to cash out. Only when on-chain verifiable mechanisms (such as TVL fraud detection and liquidity sandwich attacks monitoring) are robust, can the market truly move towards standardization.

（VI）Industry Path Forward: Transparency, Collaboration, and Returning to Basics

Laura Shin: So far in our discussion, we have outlined areas for improvement for all parties involved, including VCs, project teams, liquidity providers, exchanges, and retail investors themselves. What do you think needs to be improved?

Omar Shakeeb: For founders, the primary task is to validate product-market fit rather than blindly pursuing high funding. Experience has shown that instead of raising fifty million dollars but failing to create market demand, it is better to first use two million dollars to validate feasibility and then gradually expand. This is also why we release a monthly report on private market liquidity. Only by bringing all dark operations into the light can the market truly achieve healthy growth.

Taran Sabharwal: The current structural contradictions in the crypto market have put founders in a dilemma. They must resist the temptation of short-term wealth and uphold value creation while also facing pressure from high development costs. Some foundations have morphed into founders' personal treasuries, with multi-billion-dollar market cap "zombie chains" continuously depleting ecosystem resources. As meme coins and AI concepts take turns in the hype cycle, infrastructure projects are mired in liquidity drought, with some teams even forced to delay token launches for two years. This systemic distortion is severely squeezing builders' room to survive.

Omar Shakeeb: Take Eigen, for example, when its valuation reached 60-70 billion dollars, there were buy orders of 20-30 million dollars off-market, yet the foundation refused to release liquidity. This extremely conservative strategy actually missed an opportunity; they could have inquired whether the team needed 20 million dollars to accelerate the roadmap or allowed early investors to cash out 5-10% of their holdings for a reasonable return. The market fundamentally is a collaborative network of value distribution, not a zero-sum game. If the project team monopolizes the value chain, ecosystem participants will eventually exit.

Taran Sabharwal: This exposes the most fundamental power play in tokenomics, where founders always see early exits by investors as betrayal but overlook that liquidity itself is a key indicator of ecosystem health. When all participants are forced to lock up their assets, the seemingly stable market cap actually harbors systemic risk.

Omar Shakeeb: The current crypto market is in urgent need of establishing a positive feedback value distribution mechanism: Allowing early investors to exit at a reasonable time not only attracts high-quality long-term capital but also creates a synergistic effect of capital with different horizons. Short-term hedge funds provide liquidity, while long-term funds support development. This tiered collaboration mechanism is far more conducive to ecosystem prosperity than mandatory lock-ups, with the key being to build a trust bond. The reasonable return for Series A investors will attract continued investment from Series B strategic capital.

José Macedo: Founders need to face a harsh reality: behind every successful project, there are numerous failures. When the market crazily pursues a certain concept, most teams ultimately spend two years unable to launch a token, creating a vicious cycle of concept arbitrage, essentially overdrawing the industry's innovation. The true breakthrough lies in returning to the essence of the product, developing real needs with the smallest viable funding, rather than chasing signals from the capital market heat. Particularly, one must beware of the collective misjudgment caused by VC false signals. When a concept receives a large amount of funding, it often leads the founder to misinterpret it as a genuine market need. Exchanges, as industry gatekeepers, should strengthen their infrastructure functions, establish market maker disclosure systems, ensure on-chain verifiable circulation data, and standardize over-the-counter trading reporting processes. Only by perfecting the market infrastructure can founders break free from the "no hype, no survival" prisoner's dilemma and steer the industry back to the track of value creation.

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